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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT:
UNIVERSITY FEES CAN SPEAK FOR STUDENTS:
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A UNIVERSITY'S RIGHT
TO FUND STUDENT SPEECH VIA A MANDATED ACTIVITIES FEE
Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth,
529 U.S. 217 (2000)
I. FACTS
The Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin, like many
other universities, requires full-time students to pay a mandatory non-
refundable student activity fee separate from tuition. 1 The activity fee is
designed to create a forum for extracurricular student speech.2 The uni-
versity dispenses portions of the fee to registered student organizations
(RSO) in order to fund activities engaging in a wide variety of political
or ideological speech. 3 A student organization must meet certain criteria
to become eligible for funding. 4 The organization must: (1) be
not-for-profit; (2) consist primarily of students; (3) have students direct
and maintain the organization; (4) connect with student life on campus;
(5) adhere to all federal, state, city, and university nondiscrimination laws
and policies; (6) identify a student as a contact person; (7) provide
information required on the registration form; and (8) abide by all
regulations set out in the Student Organization Handbook. 5 Students'
interests in RSOs are represented by the student government, which
includes the Associated Students of Madison (ASM) and its Student
Services Finance Committee (SSFC).6
1. Southworth v. Grebe, No. 96-C-292-S, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20980, at *2 -*8 (W.D. Wis.
1996). The nonrefundable fee (otherwise referred to as the segregated fee), which was $165.75 per
semester during the 1995-96 school year and $190.45 per semester during the 1996-97 school year,
was directly deposited in the state treasury by the university. Id; see also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 36.09(1)
(West 1992 & Supp. 2000) (stating that the Board of Regents governs the direction and maintenance of
the University of Wisconsin). For a discussion of student activity fees in North Dakota universities,
see infra Part Iv.B.
2. Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 717, 718 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 526 U.S. 1038 (1999).
The students do not dispute that the activity fee supports a public forum for student speech. Id. at 722.
3. Southworth, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20980 at *7. The finance committee of the student govern-
ment is allowed to give direction and approval only on how the non-allocable funds are distributed;
however, the chancellor and the Board of Regents always have the final decision. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at *5-*6. During the 1996-97 school year approximately 140 of the 623 student organiza-
tions were funded through the disbursement of the allocable portion of the student activity fee. Id. at
*8 (stating that the majority of the organizations funded were devoted to academic, cultural, or recrea-
tional purposes and only a few could be characterized as furthering political or ideological activities).
Funding is only available to those private student organizations that have become RSOs. Southworth,
151 F.3d at 719-20.
6. Southworth, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20980, at *3. SSFC is an affiliate of ASM, which reviews
ASM budgets and University budgets funded by the activity fee. Id.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
The activity fee is divided into two separate categories: allocable and
non-allocable. 7 The non-allocable portion of the fee makes up eighty
percent of the total and is expended on student health services, intra-
mural sports, and maintenance of the student union and debt services. 8
The allocable portion of the fee funds the General Student Service Fund
(GSSF) and the GSSF is used to subsidize registered student organiza-
tions. 9 In the 1996-1997 school year, the allocable portion of the funds
went to subsidize 140 of the 623 total registered student organizations.10
Both the Board of Regents and the ASM govern how the allocable por-
tion of the activity fee moneys will be disbursed among the organiza-
tions.1I All students are invited to run for election to ASM or SSFC in
order to participate in the allocation of funding to student organiza-
tions. 12 If students do not choose to run, however, they still may sit in on
ASM and SSFC meetings where funding decisions are made.13
Organizations may seek funding in one of three ways.14 First, a
student organization can apply to the SSFC for GSSF funds. 15 Second, it
can seek funds through ASM's Student Activity Fund.16 Finally, a stu-
dent organization can attempt to get funding via a student referendum. 17
The first two ways are administered by the ASM in a session open to
everyone. 18 The ASM then makes the initial funding decision that is
reviewed and finalized by the chancellor or the Board of Regents.19
7. Id.
8. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 223 (2000).
9. Southworth, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20980, at *4-*9. The GSSF is used to fund such
organizations as the Child Care Tuition Assistance Program; the Wisconsin Union Directorate
Distinguished Lecture Series; the third year of the recreational sports budget; the ASM budget; the
Wisconsin Public Interest Research Group (WISPIRG); and the United Council. Id. at *4-*5.
10. Id. at *8-*9.
11. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 36.09(5) (West 1992 & Supp. 2000), titled Responsibilities, which
states in part:
Students in consultation with the chancellor and subject to the final confirmation of the
board shall have the responsibility for the disposition of those student fees that constitute
substantial support for campus student activities. The students of each institution or
campus shall have the right to organize themselves in a manner they determine and to
select their representatives to participate in institutional governance.
Id.
12. See Southworth, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20980 at *5 (discussing that all students have the
opportunity to become a part of the ASM through the democratic process).
13. See id. (stating that the funding decision meetings are open to the public).
14. Id. at *6.
15. Id. The GSSF provides funding for all registered organizations that supply ongoing services
assisting a substantial number of students. Id.
16. Id. This funding is also "divided into three different types of grants: operations grants, event
grants and travel grants." Id.
17. Id. A student referendum is where the student body votes in a campus election whether to
approve or disapprove an assessment for funding. Id.
18. Id.
19. Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 225 (2000).
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Both parties in Southworth stipulated that the university administered the
first two ways of funding in a viewpoint neutral manner.
20
In the referendum program, the student body can vote to approve
or disapprove funding for a specific RSO.21 The ASM approves the vote
of the students in the referendum process by voluntarily viewing the
referendum decision as binding.22 Then, in order to obtain the funding,
an organization must submit a form to request reimbursement of a speci-
fic cash amount. 23 The student body has more power in the referendum
process than in the other two processes because the student body has the
ability to vote on funding as well as the ability to veto an ASM funding
decision. 24 Because of the difference between this process and the first
two processes, the parties agreed that viewpoint neutrality did not extend
to the referendum process. 25
Three students registered at the University of Wisconsin-Madison
challenged the collection of the activity fee. 26 They challenged the uni-
versity's ability to fund student organizations involved in expressive
activity that is political or ideological in nature and against their individ-
ual beliefs. 27 The students specifically objected to eighteen student
groups that were pursuing political or ideological goals. 28 In federal
district court, the students claimed that the collection of the fee violated
their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech, freedom of associa-
tion, and free exercise of religion, as well as their rights under the Religi-
ous Freedom Restoration Act. 29 The parties filed cross-motions for
summary judgment, and the court granted the students' motion, finding
20. Southworth v. Grebe, No. 96-C-292-S, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20980, at *5 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
21. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 224.
22. Id.
23. Southworth, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20980, at *7.
24. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 224. In the year 1995-96, the student body, through the referendum
process, gave an RSO named WISPIRG $45,000 from the GSSF. Id. In the same year, the student
body vetoed another RSO from receiving any GSSF funding. Id.
25. See id. at 224-25 (explaining that the parties stipulated to this during oral arguments).
26. Southworth, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20980, at *1-*2.
27. Id. During the 1995-96 school year, the SSFC distributed a total of $974,200 of student fee
moneys to private student organizations. Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 717, 719 (7th Cir. 1998).
28. See Southworth, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20980, at *9 (stating examples of the eighteen groups
as WISPIRG; the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual Campus Center; the Campus Women's Center; the UW
Greens; the Madison AIDS Support Network; the International Socialist Organization; the Ten Percent
Society). Most of the eighteen groups further at least an incidental educational goal along with the
political or ideological goal; however, the goals of four of the eighteen RSOs specifically further
political or ideological views and not educational views. Id. The UW Greens' purpose is to advance
environmentally related causes; they pursued the introduction of bills to the Wisconsin Legislature,
along with supporting the Green Party and Ralph Nader for President. Southworth, 151 F.3d at 720-21.
The International Socialist Organization's goal is to encourage Socialism on campus. Id. at 720. The
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual Campus Center's goals are to promote pro-homosexual attitudes and political
activism. Id. The Ten Percent Society's goal is to educate the student body on issues that affect the
homosexual population. Id. at 721.
29. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
2001]
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that the segregated fee violated their First Amendment rights to freedom
of speech and association. 30
The district court relied on two prior Supreme Court decisions that
addressed the mandatory fee doctrine along with a California Supreme
Court decision that directly addressed mandatory student fees used to
fund student organizations involved in political or ideological speech. 3 1
These prior cases set out the strict scrutiny standard that a state may
compel individual funding of an organization only if there is a suffi-
ciently compelling reason to do so, and only if the organization's use of
such funding is "germane to the purposes that justified the requirement
of support." 32 In adopting the California Supreme Court's holding, the
district court found that a state university has a compelling interest in
funding free expression on campus through organizations furthering
educational benefits. 33 If the educational benefits are only incidental to
the organizations' political or ideological mission, then the funding is no
longer found to be germane to the purpose. 34 At the point that it is no
longer germane, the court stated, it is not narrowly tailored to avoid
unnecessary infringement of the students' First Amendment rights. 35
The court found that all of the eighteen organizations infringed on
the students' rights because more than a de minimis number of them
used the funding from the segregated fee to support a primarily political
or ideological mission. 36 Therefore, the court held it was unconstitution-
al for the state to compel students to fund an organization to which the
students objected when the organization offered no more than incidental
educational benefits to the university campus. 37 The court noted that all
organizations may be funded by the mandatory fee; however, there must
be an opt out system in place for those objecting students who do not
wish their fee portion to support specific organizations. 38 The court did
30. Southworth, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20980, at *36.
31. See id. at *13-*24 (discussing the United States Supreme Court cases Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) and Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990), and the California
Supreme Court case Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 844 P.2d 500 (Cal. 1993)). The court noted
that California law was not controlling but highly influential since it was the only decision that had
directly considered the issue of a First Amendment challenge to compelled funding of student
organizations that engaged in political or ideological speech. Id. at *24.
32. Id. at *16 (quoting Smith, 844 P.2d at 508).
33. Id. at *23.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See id. at *26-*27 (describing the four organizations that primarily involved political or
ideological missions and did not offer educational benefits).
37. Id. at *29.
38. Id. at *30.
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not address the issues of First Amendment rights to free exercise of
religion and rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
39
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court's
decision, and the university was restrained from requiring students to
fund RSOs pursuing political or ideological expression.40 The court
stated that if the university chose to mandate funding it was then re-
quired to provide its students with an optional opt out program.4 1 The
university argued that the fee and the speech it funded were appropriate
to further its mission and, thus, constitutional. 42 Certiorari was granted,
and the United States Supreme Court held that the First Amendment
allows a public university to mandate its students to pay an activity fee
that is used to fund a student program that furthers extracurricular
student speech as long as the program is viewpoint neutral. 43
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble . . . ."44 Implicit in those rights is the
freedom of association.4 5 The First Amendment prohibits restrictions or
limitations on the right to speak or associate. 46 Therefore the govern-
ment is only able to prevent an individual from speech or association if
such a restriction is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. 47
The Supreme Court has recognized that along with the rights to speak
and associate are the rights not to speak and associate. 48 The First
Amendment, thus, offers protection for the freedom against compelled
39. Id. at *36; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000b (1994).
40. Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 717, 735 (7th Cir. 1998).
41. See id. (stating that the opt out program could be of any variation but must provide objecting
students with a way to not use their portion to support views to which they object).
42. Id.
43. Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 221 (2000). The Court held that the collection of
funding by the university was constitutional and remanded for further proceedings on the distribution
of the funding on a referendum basis. Id.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
45. See, e.g., Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 6(1971); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
430 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S 449, 462-63 (1958).
46. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943) (holding that
the government can not constitutionally compel students in a public school to give a flag salute each
morning before the start of school).
47. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (holding that a ban on electioneering within
100 feet of the election poll was narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling state interest of providing
its citizens the right to vote freely without the interference of those lowering the integrity and
reliability of the voting process).
48. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641-42.
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speech. 49 The government is subject to limitations when it compels
funding for speech from individuals who oppose such speech.50
The Supreme Court has held that an organization with limited
association 51 may not use member dues for political or ideological
speech not germane to the organization's purpose when a member
opposes such use.52 If the speech is germane to the organization's pur-
pose, however, the dues may be used for political or ideological speech
despite any member objections.5 3 This holding extends into limited
association areas such as unions, union dues in the public-employment
sector, and bar associations. 54
When addressing the issue in a higher learning setting, however, a
university may make judgments regarding how to best allocate its own
funds and to make its own academic decisions. 55 The Supreme Court
has held that teachers should be able to cultivate and practice a free spirit
in teaching because if that is stifled by the government a chilling effect
would occur. 56 Having such control is vital for the survival of a univer-
sity's purpose of creating an atmosphere conducive to a broad range of
speech. 57 Since it is vital for a university to have control over its own
decisions, the Supreme Court has specifically stressed that First Amend-
ment protections must be afforded to objecting students in a higher
learning institution. 58 The protection granted by the Supreme Court to
objecting students is that the institution must distribute its student fee
expenditures in a viewpoint neutral manner. 59
A. GOVERNMENTAL FUNDING WITHIN A PUBLIC ORGANIZATION
The First Amendment is a safeguard for freedom of speech, assem-
bly, and association; thus, it protects individuals from government
49. Id.
50. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 222-23 (1977) (discussing the limitation on
the government that requires it to use mandated funding in a limited association in a way that is
germane to the purpose of the association); see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830-31 (1995) (holding that the government may only compel or restrict speech if
it is done in a content-neutral manner).
51. See Lehnert v. Farris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 515 (1991). The Supreme Court has not
specifically defined a limited association; however, Supreme Court cases infer that it is an association
of persons to further a limited purpose or purposes. See, e.g., Abood, 431 U.S. at 221-22.
52. Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 515.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 532; see also Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 16 (1990).
55. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981) (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234, 263 (1957)).
56. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
57. Id.
58. Id.; see also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1972).
59. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 718, 829 (1995).
[VOL. 77:549
2001] CASE COMMENT 555
restrictions or limitations on the right to speak or associate. 60  In order
for the government to lawfully restrict speech, it must be able to show
that such restriction is necessary to further a compelling state interest. 61
Just as the government cannot restrict speech without incurring limita-
tions, it also cannot compel speech without incurring limitations. 62 The
government compels individuals to hear, adopt, or associate with speech
when it furthers such speech by funding the speech with the use of the
individuals' funds. 63 Since the First Amendment protects individuals
from compelled speech, the Supreme Court has limited the govern-
ment's ability to compel individual funds to further speech, assembly,
and association. 64
The Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of govern-
ment redistributing funds within an organization in a line of cases on
union-security issues. 65 The first decision, Railway Employees' Depart-
ment v. Hanson,66 involved the issue of an agency-shop arrangement. 67
The arrangement was permitted by the Railway Labor Act, which was
enacted to allow a union to compel union membership and dues. 68 The
Court found that this compulsion should only extend to the financial
support of the collective-bargaining activities of the union. 69 The Court
warned that a different issue would arise if the activities funded by the
compelled member dues were used for purposes not germane to col-
lective bargaining. 70 The Court inferred that unions would not be able
to compel funding for expressive activity that was not germane to
60. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943).
61. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992).
62. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 238 n.38 (1977) (discussing the limitation of
government in its use of mandated funding in a limited association); see also Rosenberger, 515 U. S. at
830 (discussing the limitation that the government must only compel speech in a content-neutral
manner (citing Perry Ed. Ass'n v. Perry Local Eng'r Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983))).
63. Ry. Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 235 (1956); see also Machinists v. Street, 367
U.S. 740, 743-46 (1961); Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 116-17 (1963).
64. Abood, 431 U.S. at 211; see also Lehnert v. Fernis Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 522 (1991).
65. Hanson, 351 U.S. at 235; see also Machinists, 367 U.S. at 743-46; Ry. Clerks, 373 U.S. at
116-17; Abood, 431 U.S. at 211; Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 515 (discussing the union-security issue being
addressed in the case as an agency-shop agreement).
66. 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
67. Hanson, 351 U.S. at 228; see also Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 511 (describing an "agency shop" ar-
rangement as a contract between the government and a union in which employees within a bargaining
unit of the employer may be forced to pay union dues regardless of whether they join or decline to join
the union itself). An agency shop arrangement is typically a union security provision contained in a
collective-bargaining agreement between the government and a union in which the union is able to
ensure funds by compelling non-union members to pay a service fee that is equivalent to the dues paid
by members. Id.
68. Hanson, 351 U.S. at 228-29. The enactment of the Railway Labor Act was the first time that
unions were allowed to compel non-union members in the bargaining unit to contribute to expenses.
Machinists, 367 U.S. at 811.
69. See Hanson, 351 U.S. at 235 (distinguishing the compulsion of the membership from merely
compelling a payment of a fee equivalent to that of a member's dues by a nonmember employee).
70. Id.
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collective bargaining.7 1 The Court did not define germaneness but
stated that an arrangement cannot be implemented as a mechanism for
forcing ideological accordance or other action that conflicts with the
First Amendment. 72
The Court found an infringement on First Amendment rights when
the government's use of compelled funding was applied toward objec-
tionable speech that was political or ideological in nature, rather than
toward speech germane to collective bargaining. 73 As the Court began
deciding that the government was infringing on First Amendment rights,
it started to define the germaneness standard.
74
In Machinists v. Street,75 the Court directly confronted the extent to
which dues may be collected by unions to support ideological or politi-
cal activities opposed by some of the union members.76 As in Hanson,
the agency-shop arrangement was permitted by the Railway Labor Act. 77
Distinct from Hanson, the Court found "specific factual findings" that
the union dues of opposing members were being used to fund political
and ideological speech. 78 The Court directly denied unions the authori-
ty to use the dues of individual union members to fund political or
ideological activities to which the individuals had objected. 79
Two years later, Railway Clerks v. Allen80 upheld Machinists.81 The
Court stressed the importance of distinguishing between the disburse-
ment of expenditures for union activities "germane to collective bar-
gaining," and those used for political activities that may be challenged. 82
The Court specifically reiterated in Railway that it is constitutional in the
private-sector to charge nonunion member employees dues equivalent to
71. Id.
72. Id. at 235-37.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
76. Machinists, 367 U.S. at 746-49.
77. Id. at 742-43.
78. See id. at 744 n.2 (noting the lower court's findings that the funds were specifically being
used by defendants to support the political campaigns of candidates for offices of President and Vice
President of the United States, for state and local public offices, and to create political and economic
doctrines to further legislative programs).
79. Id. at 768-69 (reasoning that Congress was protecting the objecting employees' expressive
freedom and promoting collective representation by passing section 2 of the Railway Labor Act).
80. 373 U.S. 113 (1963).
81. Ry. Clerks, 373 U.S. at 118-23.
82. Id. Two separate questions must be asked to distinguish between funding that is considered
germane and funding that may be challenged. Id. First, a determination is made of what funding,
based on the record, is political. Id. Second, a determination is made of what funding, based on the
union's total funding expenditures, is political. Id. Here, the Court did not draw a line between what
funding was or was not political. Id.
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those of member dues if they are used for purposes germane to the
union's collective bargaining functions.83
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education8 4 was the first opportunity for
the Court to address the constitutionality of union-security provisions in
the public-sector. 85 Abood involved the public-employment sector, speci-
fically a public school and the governmental collection of union dues of
teachers within the school. 86 In Michigan, local government employers
and unions were given permission by the legislature to implement an
"agency shop" arrangement. 87 This arrangement allowed a union to
compel school employees to pay union dues as a condition of employ-
ment with the school, regardless of the individual employee's willingness
to become a member of the union.88
A number of teachers filed a class action law suit, which-claimed, in
part, that they did not approve of the union's involvement in "econom-
ic, political, professional, scientific and religious [expression]." 89 The
teachers stated that this was a violation of not only their state rights but
also their constitutional right to freedom of association protected by the
First and the Fourteenth Amendments. 90 The issue presented to the
Supreme Court was whether it was constitutional to use mandatory
service charges to further "political purposes" which were unrelated to
collective bargaining. 91
The Court found it unconstitutional for the government to condi-
tion employment upon the funding of union speech that was not in
agreement with an employee's individual beliefs. 92 The Court held that
a union could not use the agency-shop provision to mandate individual
members to pay dues that furthered political or ideological activities not
germane to the purpose of the association. 93 The purpose of the
83. Id. (stating that the desire for labor peace and the avoidance of the risk of "free riders" were
no less important in the private sector than in the public sector).
84. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
85. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 211 (distinguishing between this case, which involves government
employment, and Ry. Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956), which involved private
employment). The differences that arise between a union representing public rather than private
employees in the area of collective bargaining do not amount to differences in First Amendment rights.
Id. at 229-31 (discussing the nature of both public- and private-sector collective bargaining).
86. Id. at 211-12 (discussing teachers who were required to pay union fees as a condition of
employment within the public school).
87. Id. at 212.
88. Id. This fee was an amount equal to the regular fees paid by union members. Id. All teach-
ers, whether they were union members or non-union members, were required by the agency-shop
arrangement to pay the fee within sixty days of hire or they would be subject to discharge. Id.
89. Id. at 213.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 215.
92. Id. at 241-42.
93. Id. at 222-23; see also Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 122-23 (1963). This was limited to
only those employees who made their objection known to the union. Id.
20011
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"agency shop" arrangement was collective bargaining, and therefore, as
long as the activities furthered collective bargaining, it was not a constitu-
tional violation. 94 A First Amendment violation can be shown to exist if
the agency-shop agreement furthers an objecting party's political or
ideological views.95
The Court stressed that there exists core First Amendment concerns
regarding unions mandating financial support because of the long tradi-
tion unions possess in engaging in a wide variety of political expres-
sion.96 The Court also stated that "something more" 97 than merely
compelling the expenditures of employees is needed to make a First
Amendment challenge if the funds are used in the collective-bargaining
capacity of the union.98 The decision in Abood coincides with the
decisions in the private sector cases since in both situations the Court is
allowing the agreement to further the benefits of union labor relations.99
There is equal importance in the public-sector for employee peace and
eliminating "free-riders." 100 Lastly, the Court clearly established that a
state cannot condition employment on membership in a political party
or religious affiliation.101
Abood did not attempt to define specifically what collective bargain-
ing activities are constitutionally permissible or which ones are
prohibited.102 Nor did the Court attempt to specifically define "ger-
mane," 103 leaving those interpretations for a case-by-case analysis on the
relevancy of the funding to the purpose of the organization.1 04
94. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 217 n.10 (1977) (stating that the expenditures
must further the purpose of the association or "agency shop" agreement for the collection of the fees
to be constitutionally allowed for political or ideological activities).
95. Id. at 237 (stating that there is a First Amendment violation if it can be shown that an
individual objects to the government using funds to promote political or ideological speech that does
not further the purpose of the association).
96. Id. at 222.
97. Id. The court did not define the "something more" that may invoke a First Amendment
violation if the purpose is found to be germane to the purpose of collective bargaining. Id.
98. See id. (stressing that there must be an objection by a member in order for a violation to
exist).
99. See id. (stating "the judgment clearly made in Hanson and Street is that such interference as
exists is constitutionally justified by the legislative assessment of the important contribution of the union
shop to the system of labor relations established by Congress").
100. See id. ; see also Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 121 (1963); Keller v. State Bar of Cal.,
496 U.S. 1, 12 (1990) (describing "free riders" as those employees who are gaining the benefits of
union negotiations without joining the union or paying dues).
101. Abood, 431 U. S. at 235.
102. See id. at 236 (stating that a precise definition would be even harder in the public sector than
in the private sector because the "process of establishing a written collective-bargaining agreement
prescribing the terms and conditions of public employment may require not merely concord at the
bargaining table, but subsequent approval by other public authorities; related budgetary and
appropriations decisions might be seen as an integral part of the bargaining process").
103. See id. (stating the difficulty of determining what is germane to collective bargaining).
104. Id. at 236-37.
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The principles developed by the Court in Abood regarding govern-
ment funding of political or ideological activity were continued in 1991
in Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n. 105 Lehnert set forth a test of specific
guidelines to determine when the government may constitutionally autho-
rize the compulsion of nonmember employees to fund union activi-
ties. 106 In order for employee funds to be distributed to a union activity,
the expenditures must: (1) be germane to collective bargaining activity
and (2) be justified by the government's vital policy interest in labor
peace and collective-bargaining agreement.107 The decision in Lehnert
defined more precisely what is not germane to collective bargaining.108
The Court found that there was not enough of a connection between the
activities funded by public employees and the union's role as a bargain-
ing representative in a legislative context. 109
The principles set by the Court in Abood regarding government
funding of political or ideological activity were extended to bar associa-
tions in Keller v. State Bar of California.l10 Keller held that the govern-
ment does not have the authority to distribute fees collected in a bar
association in a manner that is not germane to its mission.111 The Bar
Association of California conditioned becoming a member on the pay-
ment of dues and was using the dues to further political and ideological
causes and beliefs. 112 The plaintiffs contended that their personal beliefs
were in opposition to the views they were mandated to fund and, there-
fore, the mandated fee was a violation of their First Amendment
rights. 113 The Court determined that the controlling standard in this case
was "whether the challenged expenditures are necessarily or reasonably
incurred for the purpose of regulating the legal profession or 'improv-
ing the quality of the legal service available to the people of the
State.'"l' 4  The Court held that a state bar may, therefore,
constitutionally mandate the funding of political or ideological speech if
the speech falls within the purpose of the membership to the bar
association. 115
105. 500 U.S. 507 (1991).
106. Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 518.
107. Id. at 519.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 519-20. The union is allowed to further political interests if they are germane to its
collective bargaining purpose, but it must not add to the burdening of First Amendment protections. Id.
at 520; see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 236 (1977).
110. 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
111. Keller, 496 U.S. at 14.
112. See id (stating that the payment of membership dues was a condition upon employment).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 14 (citing Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 843 (1961) (plurality opinion)).
115. See id. at 13-14 (stating that a difficult question arises in defining what is not "germane" to
the purpose for which the association is being compelled).
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The Court, in analyzing the issue in Keller, did not discuss the issues
of eliminating the "free rider" because it acknowledged that there is a
difference between the relationship of unions and their members and the
State Bar Association and its members. 116 Unions were created in part to
act as participants in the democratic processes of their states and to be
representatives for their members. 117 A union's representation provides
its members with benefits such as negotiations with management and
peaceful labor relations.'1 8 It was because of the benefits that unions
provided that the legislature enacted the agency-shop laws to cure the
problem of "free riders."11 9 The State Bar of California was established
to provide professional advice and govern the legal profession, not to act
as a representative for its members in the state's democratic processes. 120
The members of the State Bar did not receive a direct benefit from their
bar membership like the union members who benefited from negotia-
tions with management and peaceful labor relations.121
B. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF GOVERNMENTAL FUNDING WITHIN A
PUBLIC UNIVERSITY
Until Southworth, the Supreme Court had not addressed the issue of
whether the government could mandate student funds and distribute the
funds to organizations furthering political or ideological views. 122 The
Court had, however, addressed the issue of how the government must
distribute such student funds. 123 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the
University of Virginia124 held that when the government acts to foster
student viewpoints that are religious or political in nature, it must do so
in a viewpoint neutral manner. 125
At the University of Virginia, a student group must become a "Con-
tracted Independent Organization" (CIO) before it is eligible for fund-
ing reimbursement. 126 CIO status is only given to those organizations
116. Id. at 12.
117. Id. at 12-13. The Court noted that in the case of unions it would be ironic if the individual
members being charged to make government decisions through the democratic process were not able
to speak for themselves. Id.
118. Id at 12.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 13.
121. See id. (stating that the collective bargaining purpose of a union helps with labor peace,
which in turn benefits the union members). The Court in this case found no need to acknowledge the
issue of preventing "free riders." Id.
122. Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 230 (2000).
123. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 835-37 (1995).
124. 515 U. S. 819 (1995).
125. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845 (holding that viewpoint discrimination used by the
university not only in content but also in application was a violation of students' free speech).
126. See id. at 823 (stating that the University of Virginia is governed by the Rector and Visitors
of the University of Virginia according to state law).
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that are primarily made up and managed by students and that also
comply with specific procedural requirements. 127 Some of the CIOs are
able to apply for funding from the Student Activities Fund (SAF) which
is governed by the university and managed mainly through the student
government.128 The CIOs that receive SAF support are organizations
which "are related to the educational purpose of the University."129
This relation must not be political, which is defined so that it is limited to
electioneering and lobbying, or religious, which is defined as "primarily
promot[ing] or manifest[ing] a particular belief in or about a deity or an
ultimate reality" in nature. 130
In Rosenberger, a group of students claimed their First Amendment
rights were violated when the university denied funding for their student
organization newspaper based solely on the newspaper's religious
nature. 131 The objecting students in Rosenberger were part of an organi-
zation, named Wide Awake Productions (WAP), that had become a CIO
and was formed as a means to publish a periodical of "philosophical
and religious expression."132 By the first publication, it was established
as a religious journal offering Christian viewpoints on college life. 133
WAP applied to SAF for funding for the printing of the periodical and
was denied on the basis of the organization's "religious activity," as
defined by the university guidelines.134
The Court stated that the government's violation of the students'
First Amendment rights was even more obtrusive because it was the parti-
cular view of the speaker that was being discriminated against, rather
than just the subject matter. 135 Viewpoint discrimination is an even more
excessive form of content discrimination; thus, the government is not
allowed to use it as a basis for its expenditure restrictions. 136 The Court
further added that once a state established a limited forum,1 37 a state
127. Id. One of the university's procedural requirements is that the CIO must provide a written
disclaimer to the university stating that the CIO is separate from the university. Id. This eliminates the
university's responsibility for the CIO. Id.
128. See id. at 824 (stating that SAF money is received from a portion of the mandatory student
fee assessed to full-time students each semester).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 825.
131. See id. at 822-23 (challenging the university's regulation of its funding and the authority to
deny funding to the students' particular group).
132. Id. at 825. In order to submit a claim for funding from the student activity fees, an
organization must first become a CIO. Id. at 823.
133. Id. at 826.
134. Id. at 827.
135. Id. at 829 (citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992)).
136. Id. at 829 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)
(stating that this was true despite the fact that the limited public forum was created by the university
itself)).
137. See id. (defining limited public forum as confining a forum to a limited purpose solely for
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must constitutionally abide by its own guidelines. 138 The Court noted
that if a state included a particular subject of speech in the forum, any
viewpoint of that subject matter must be allowed.139 A state cannot
exclude a particular viewpoint on a subject matter if it has included every
other viewpoint on the same subject matter. 140 This will be upheld even
if a state argues that the viewpoint is not considered reasonable in light
of the purpose served by the forum. 141 When a limited forum has been
created by the government to include the very speech it is now trying to
exclude, the Court does not need to determine whether the speech is
reasonable to the purpose of the forum. 142 The Court held that if the
government creates a limited forum to include a particular subject, all
points of view on the subject must be allowed in the forum.143
The Court in Rosenberger did not discuss the reasonableness factor
since the university had created a limited forum that included student
speech on the subject of college life. 144 The Court expressed that the
state was then unable to discriminate based on the fact that the subject
was discussed from a religious point of view. 145 The regulation set forth
by the SAF was a clear showing of the university favoring its own
messages over the private speech of students. 146 The action taken by the
university to try to exclude the students viewpoints on previously accept-
able subject matter violated the petitioners' First Amendment right to
free speech both in its terms and in its application.147
C. PUBLIC FORUM "VIEWPOINT NEUTRALITY" STANDARD
Along with Rosenberger, the "public forum" cases are also instruc-
tive and lend analogous support to the standard of "viewpoint
neutrality."148 Public forum is one element in determining whether a
government regulation that puts restrictions on the "time, place, or
manner" of speech violates the First Amendment. 149 If the speech






142. See id. (noting that a state may create a limited forum but after doing so it may not discrimi-
nate the speech that it has defined as acceptable based on a particular viewpoint because to
discriminate based on viewpoint is unconstitutional).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 829-30.
145. See id. (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806
(1985) (stating that the state was unable to lawfully exclude the students' speech when the university
already included such speech within the boundaries of the limited public forum)).
146. Id. at 834-35.
147. Id. at 837.
148. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); see also Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788,
806-08 (1985); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
149. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806-08. If the government regulation restricts the content of the
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occurs in a public forum, which is property intentionally open to the
public, the government must show that the content-based restriction on
such speech is necessary to further a significant government interest.
150
On the other hand, a private owner of property, or a non-public
forum, is able to use his or her property under private control and for its
specifically dedicated purpose.151 If the speech occurs in a non-public
forum, the determination of whether a content-based restriction is
constitutionally permissible turns on whether the restriction is a substan-
tial interference with speech. 152 If the interference is not substantial, the
government only needs to show that the restriction is rational to the
purpose being served. 153 However, if the private facility is opened up to
the public, but not considered a public forum, the functioning of the
property may still be controlled as long as any restrictions made are
reasonable in the context of the forum's purpose and are made in a
viewpoint neutral manner. 154
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund,155 in-
volved a charity drive aimed at federal employees.156  The drive was
limited to voluntary, tax-exempt, nonprofit charitable agencies that pro-
vided direct services to individuals and their families. 157 The restriction
specifically excluded legal and political advocacy groups of which
defendants were classified. 158 Defendants challenged that their First
Amendment right to seek designated funds was violated by the restric-
tion. 159 The Court held that the forum was non-public and that the
interference with expression was insubstantial.160 Therefore, the
restriction to permit some speakers and subjects while restricting others
was allowable. 161 This was allowed, however, only because the distinction
that was drawn between one speaker or subject and another was
speech then it is not important to the analysis if the speech occurs in a public forum or not; it will be
constitutionally invalid unless the speech is in a class of unprotected speech. Id.
150. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
151. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 391; see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800; Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460
U.S. at 46.
152. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806-08.
153. Id. at 806; see also Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 392-93.
154. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 392-93.
155. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
156. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 790-91 (describing the charitable organization).
157. Id. The committee organizing the drive was set up by an Executive Order through President
Eisenhower. Id. at 792. The committee was called the Combined Federal Campaign, and its purpose
was to ensure voluntary giving by federal employees. Id.
158. See id. at 792-93 (describing respondents as the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, the
Federally Employed Women Legal Defense and Education Fund, the Indian Law Resource Center,
the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law, and the Natural Resources Defense Council).
159. Id. at 795.
160. Id. at 803-06.
161. Id. at 807-08.
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reasonable in light of the purpose served and was facilitated in a
viewpoint neutral manner. 162
The viewpoint neutrality standard is a protection set by the Court as
a safeguard for the protection of First Amendment rights. 163 In Cor-
nelius, the Court described a violation of viewpoint neutrality by ex-
plaining that "the government violates the First Amendment when it
denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he espous-
es on an otherwise includable subject."1 64 It should be noted, however,
that a speaker may be excluded from a non-public forum if he is not a
member of the class of speakers for whom the forum was created, or if
he wishes to express a subject not included within the purpose of the
forum. 165
In Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District1 66
a religious organization had applied for access to the district school
facilities after school hours to show a film on family and child raising. 167
It was denied access pursuant to a New York law that only gave access to
"social, civic and recreational meetings," which excluded meetings for
religious purposes. 168 The district denied access because the film that
was to be shown at the school appeared to portray religious affilia-
tions. 169 The Court held that it was unconstitutional to deny access to
Lamb's Chapel because the subject matter in the film was not religion,
but it was instead family and child rearing from a religious viewpoint.170
Just as private owners are allowed control of the use of their proper-
ty, the district was allowed to control the use of the school property when
the property was not functioning for school purposes. 171 Therefore, the
district did not have to open the property up after school hours to any
speaker or to any subject matter of speech. 172 The district did, however,
open the school property to social, civic, recreational, and political
organizations that complied with state law. 173 The Court found that since
162. Id. at 809-13. Viewpoint neutrality is mandated when a type of speech, based on the speak-
er, the content, or the subject, is included in a public forum or a private forum open to the public, and
within that includable portion, one is excluded based solely on the view expressed. Id.
163. Id. Viewpoint neutrality is a safeguard for not only those wishing to speak because their
speech can not be discriminated on the basis of its view, but also for those who wish to object to
speech because they are given a guarantee that particular viewpoints will not be favored over others.
Id.
164. Id. at 806.
165. Id.
166. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
167. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 386.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 396-97.
170. Id. at 393.
171. Id. at 390.




the district opened the property up for such a vast array of expressive
purposes, any restrictions put on the property must be subject to the
same constitutional limitations as restrictions on a public forum. 17 4
Since one of the permitted uses for the school property was social meet-
ings pertaining to the welfare of the community, anyone could use the
property for such a purpose.175 Thus, any individual or group could use
the property for a meeting on family childrearing, regardless of the
point of view by which the discussion was expressed. 176 The Court
found that the district was allowing the facilitation of meetings on child-
rearing from any point of view except a religious point of view. 177 The
Court held that the district was discriminating against one viewpoint over
others in a subject of speech that was otherwise acceptable on the school
premises. 178
The case of Widmar v. Vincent179 addressed a different aspect of
government limitations on individual First Amendment protections. 180
While Lamb's Chapel analyzed the issue of viewpoint discrimination
within a subject, Widmar discussed the issue of whether the state was
allowed to discriminate against an entire subject. 181 In Widmar, the issue
was not whether the government was restricting only speech from a
religious point of view in a public forum, but rather whether the universi-
ty was discriminating against all religious speech based on its content. 182
This issue still turned on whether the Court found the university to
be a public forum or a private forum since it was the state that created
the forum and made a distinction as to what speech it allowed on the
premises.183 The university had opened the use of all facilities to regis-
tered student groups but did not want to open the use of the facilities for
religious groups desiring to use the facility for worship and discus-
sion. 184 The Court stated that since the university created a public
forum, it must justify any speech restrictions that it enforces. 185 The
Court held that when a university creates a forum open to the public any
174. See id. (explaining that the district must show any restriction placed on speech was justified
by a compelling state interest and the restriction was narrowly drawn to achieve that state interest).
175. Id. at 357-58.
176. Id. at 393.
177. Id. at 395.
178. See id. at 395-97 (stating that there would be no doubt that a meeting on child rearing would
be allowed by the district if it would have been sponsored by the school instead of a church
organization).
179. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
180. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277.
181. Id. at 266.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 267.
184. Id. at 269.
185. Id. at 267.
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restriction must either be narrowly drawn to further a compelling state
interest or else regulated in a content-neutral manner. 186
The university argued that a compelling state interest was one of the
requirements of the Establishment Clause.187 The Court found that any
religious benefits from having an open forum at a university were
incidental to the restrictions outlined in the Establishment Clause.188
This was true because merely supplying a forum open to all student
groups does not mean that the university is conferring or approving the
content of speech that may be spoken.189 The forum was also open to
such a wide range of speakers that there were too many types of speech
for one subject to gain all or the majority of the benefits. 190 The Court
noted that its holding did not undermine the competence of a university
to form reasonable time, place, and manner regulations.191 The Court
also added that a university may make individual judgments as to how to
best allocate its funds and to make its own academic decision on "who
may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be
admitted to study."1 92
D. THE UNIQUE ROLE OF A UNIVERSITY
Justice Stevens, in his concurrence in Widmar, recognized not only
the content-neutrality standard but also the unique role of a univer-
sity. 193 He stressed that the "atmosphere" of a university includes the
activities of campus life where academic freedom becomes a special
concern in examining First Amendment issues. 194 Although Justice
Stevens was without support in his opinion in Widmar, he had not been
entirely unsupported in finding the special importance of academic
freedom, since the Court on previous occasions had found the same
importance. 195
186. Id. at 278.
187. Id. at 270. The Establishment Clause states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion .. " U.S. CONST. amend. I. The clause was made applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
188. Id. at 274.
189. Id.
190. See id. (stating that there were over 100 student groups on campus that were all able to use
the benefits of the open forum for their specified speech). The Court noted that if the Establishment
Clause barred the extension of general benefits to religious groups, "a church could not be protected
by the police and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk kept in repair." Id. at 274-75.
191. Id. at 276.
192. Id. (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957)).
193. Id. at 278-80 (Stevens, J., concurring).
194. See id. at 279 n.2 (stating that it is a university's purpose to provide an atmosphere that is the
most advantageous to speculation, experimentation, and creation).
195. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); see also
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1972).
566 [VOL. 77:549
CASE COMMENT
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the University of the State of
New York, 196 the Court stated that "our Nation is deeply committed to
safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of
us." 197 The Court went further in stating that, as such a value is tran-
scribed, academic freedom becomes a special concern of the First
Amendment.1 9 8 By limiting the power of the states to restrict the free-
dom of speech and association there is a higher concern in American
schools simply because a learning institution's mission is to foster all
types of ideas.1 99 Our nation depends on academic freedom to foster
future leaders by ensuring that there is exposure to a robust and wide
range of ideas in our higher learning institutions. 2 00 A university is a
"marketplace of ideas" and the protection of constitutional freedoms is
therefore most vital in such an environment. 2 01
In Sweezy v. New Hampshire,20 2 the Court stressed that academic
freedom is essential to our nation's universities and that the vital role of
training our youth should not be underestimated. 20 3 The opinion fur-
ther emphasized that "[t]eachers and students must always remain free
to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and under-
standing; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die." 2 04 Where
state-operated schools are involved, there is a recognized need for the
state and the school officials to have authority and control of the schools
and therefore First Amendment protections become essential. 2 0 5 It is
imperative that the government be restricted from putting too many
limitations on speech in an atmosphere created to foster the future
leaders of America. 206 The government may regulate speech but it may
only do so with narrow specificity to keep First Amendment freedoms
alive.207
E. SUMMARY OF LEGAL BACKGROUND
In summary, when a limited association is formed, the government
is allowed to compel speech that is political or ideological in nature if
196. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
197. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
198. Id.
199. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
200. See id. (stating "[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital
than in ... American schools").
201. Id. at 487; see also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1972).
202. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
203. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250.
204. Id.
205. Healy, 403 U.S. at 180.
206. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
207. Id. at 604.
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such speech furthers the specialized purpose of the organization. 208
However, if the compelled speech is found not germane to the purpose
of the organization, upon a member objection, the government is in
violation of the First Amendment. 209 When the government creates a
public forum either by intention or by opening up private property to
the public, any speech may be prohibited if the restriction is narrowly
drawn to further a compelling state interest. 210 If there is no compelling
state interest, the public forum must be regulated in a content-neutral
manner. 211 However, a particular viewpoint on a subject matter that is
includable in the forum must not be restricted.212
The Court has held that if the government compels funding at a
university by way of student dues and then distributes them in a way to
foster viewpoints, the distribution must be done in a viewpoint neutral
manner.213 The Court has also noted that a university is a "marketplace
of ideas" that needs to be fostered in order to further stimulate future
leaders of America, and therefore it is imperative that the government
not put too many restrictions on student speech.214 Where state operated
schools are involved there is great importance in allowing the school
officials to have authority and control, which in turn creates a need to
uphold students' First Amendment protections. 215
III. ANALYSIS
A. THE COURT'S OPINION
Justice Kennedy, writing for a unanimous Court,2 1 6 began the
analysis of the case by noting that this was the second time in this decade
that constitutional issues have arose out of a university's facilitation of
208. See Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 121 (1963) (stating that the purpose of the association
was collective bargaining); see also Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 511 (1991) (stating
the purpose of the association was collective bargaining); see also Keller v. State Bar of Cal.. 496 U.S.
1, 6-10 (1990) (stating that the purpose of the association was to regulate and improve the legal
profession).
209. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235-36 (1977).
210. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 278 (1981).
211. Id. at 277.
212. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993); see also
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (holding that the
government is constitutionally restricted by the First Amendment to exclude one viewpoint and include
all other viewpoints on the same subject matter).
213. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845 (stating that viewpoint discrimination in content and in
application by the government is a violation of students' First Amendment rights).
214. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
215. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972).
216. Southworth v. Bd. of Regents, 529 U.S. 217, 219 (2000). Justice Souter filed a concurring
opinion which Justices Stevens and Breyerjoined. Id.
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extracurricular student speech. 217 This was the first time, however, that
the Court was faced with the fundamental question of whether a
university possesses a constitutional right to take part in such facilitation
in the first instance. 2 18 The Court held that the First Amendment does
afford a university the right to mandate the payment of a student activity
fee, which is used to facilitate extracurricular student speech.2 19 How-
ever, the facilitation processes must be limited in order to afford object-
ing students some protection of their First Amendment rights. 2 20 The
University of Wisconsin, through the Board of Regents, had the right to
mandate students to fund extracurricular student speech but was limited
to disbursing student funds in a viewpoint neutral manner.221 The Court
found that Wisconsin's RSO program was a viewpoint neutral facilitation
of disbursing student funds and thus held the program constitutional.
222
However, the Court was unable to find the referendum aspect of funding
constitutional because of its majoritarian facilitation process. 223
1. Student Speech may be Governmentally Funded
The Court held that the First Amendment affords a university the
right to mandate the payment of student activity fees used to facilitate
extracurricular student speech when the disbursement of funding is done
in a viewpoint neutral manner.224 The university argued that its manda-
tory activity fee, used to fund a wide range of speech, including political
or ideological speech, was for the purpose of fostering its educational
mission.225 The university's mission, defined broadly by state law, was
to develop and discover knowledge and extend knowledge beyond the
boundaries of its campus, thus stimulating society by heightening its
students' intellectual and cultural awareness. 226
The university described the activity fee as furthering the
university's mission and enhancing the educational experience of
students by furthering extracurricular activities, fostering advocacy and
debate, increasing participation in political activity and campus
administrative activity, as well as providing opportunities to develop
217. Id. at 220; see also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 822 (denying funding of certain student
activities according to university guidelines).
218. Id. at 220.
219. Id. at 221.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 222-23.
222. Id. at 234.
223. Id. at 235.
224. Id. at 221.
225. Id
226. Id.; see also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 36.01(2) (West 1994).
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social skills.227 The Court agreed with this argument and stated that the
university's mission could withstand the students' First Amendment
argument because the mission was developed and furthered for "the sole
purpose of facilitating the free and open exchange of ideas by, and
among, its students." 228
The Court noted that the general rule, on a broader level, was that
the government could further such programs by the use of taxes, which
would be binding upon the students. 229 If the university used tax dollars
to foster such programs to advocate its own political or ideological views,
it could make content-based distinctions on speech. 230 The Court noted
that when a university determines the content of the education it pro-
vides, it may make content-based decisions when it or its agents are the
speakers.2 31 However, when a university denies that the speech is its own,
the general rule on government speech does not apply.232 The Court
here directly pointed out that this was not a question of whether the
government could use student funds to further its own beliefs, but rather
whether the government can use student funds to foster the educational
mission of student speech.2 33 The students, speaking for themselves and
through themselves, were what gave the speech its "purpose and content,
not the government." 234
On the issue of government redistribution of individual funding, the
Court found that a university is distinguishable from unions and bar
associations. 235 Even though Abood and Keller, along with their prece-
dents, provided the starting point for this analysis, the Court found that
they were not controlling in the context of extracurricular student speech
227. Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 222-23 (2000).
228. Id. at 229.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See id. at 235 (stating that when the government speaks to further its own policies or beliefs
it is accountable to its electorate and the political process for its expression); see also Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (discussing the broad discretion of speech
and association a university possesses when it alone is the speaker). The rule on government speech
through its agents or employees is altogether different from when the government is compelling the
speech of others. Id. The government has limitations when it comes to encouraging private speech,
but it has broad constitutional powers when it is the speaker. Id.
232. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 229 (discussing that since government speech is not at issue the
traditional rule on government speech should not apply). The Court noted that if the objectionable
activities and speech were funded by tuition dollars and facilitated through university officials, the
government itself would be the speaker, and the university's program would be constitutionally
permissible. Id. (discussing how the holding would be different if it were the government speaking
and not the students).
233. Id.
234. See id. (doing this through the students' extracurricular action).




at a university. 236 The Court described this case law precedent as
"neither applicable nor workable" in the student speech arena. 237 The
Court ruled that the rights defined in Abood and Keller apply when a
university conditions an individual's ability to receive an education on
the funding of speech which may be contrary to his or her own views.
238
However, a university is different from a union or a bar association
because its fundamental goal is a robust and wide range of speech rather
than to further a specific area of speech. 239 In Abood, the union's
fundamental goal was to further collective bargaining and its benefits. 2
40
In Keller, the bar association's fundamental goal was to regulate the
legal profession and its members. 241 Both Abood and Keller consisted of
limited associations and thus had very narrow and easily defined
purposes. 242 A university, on the other hand, is an association with the
broad fundamental purpose of fostering all types of ideas. 243 Unlike
unions and bar associations that further only a narrowly defined area of
speech, a university seeks to encourage a very broad range of speakers
and speech.244
In Abood and Keller the constitutional protection for objecting
individuals was that the government was only allowed to compel speech
that was germane to the purpose of the organization. 245 The Court
noted, however, that the germaneness standard does not work as applied
to student speech within a university because it could not afford protec-
tion to both the objecting student and the university. 246
The Court noted the difficulty that it had encountered in prior cases
in defining germaneness and stated that it was even more difficult when
236. See id. at 230-32 (recognizing that the objecting students were being compelled to fund
speech they found objectionable). Abood held that any teacher who objected to the mandatory fee to
a union in which he or she was not a member could prevent the union from spending its monies on
views in which he or she was opposed if the views were unrelated to the union's purpose of
"collective bargaining." Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 240 (1977). Keller held that
lawyers could be mandated to join a bar association and fund only those activities germane to the
association's mission of regulating the legal profession. Keller v. State Bar of Cal. 496 U.S. 1, 16
(1990).
237. Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 230 (2000).
238. Id. at 231. The Court reasoned that students' own personal aspirations and potentials are
interfered with when the government has the ability to condition their education upon the funding of
the beliefs of others. Id. The government has thus placed a burdening condition on an individual's
education without any recognition of the government's duty to the objecting individual's beliefs. Id.
239. Id. It can be inferred from the opinion that the university's goal is much broader than the
goals of unions or bar associations. Id.
240. Abood, 431 U.S. at 211-16.
241. Keller, 496 U.S. at 5-9.
242. Id.; see also Abood, 431 U.S. at 211-16.
243. Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 232 (2000).
244. Id. at 231-32.
245. Id. at 231.
246. See id. (stating that the standard gives insufficient protection to not only the objecting
students but also the university).
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the term was applied to a university whose purpose is broader than that
of any other organization analyzed in the past.247 The difficulty began
when the Court was unable to reach a conclusion on what was germane
to the purpose of a particular association. 248 This difficulty became even
more challenging in a public university setting, which has a broader
purpose than the more limited purpose of a union or bar association.
249
The Court stated the impossibility lies when the state endeavors to arouse
a whole universe of speech and ideas as it does in a university
environment. 250
Since the university's mission was to foster all types of ideas and to
expand student's knowledge with a wide range of subjects, there was no
clear line where that mission would end and non-germane speech would
begin. 251 In fact, there was no clear intention by the university that the
language of its mission would cut off any speech at all. 252 Therefore, if
the university never intended a distinction to be drawn between germane
and non-germane speech, the Court certainly would not be able to easily
define such a distinction. 253 Insisting upon a definition for what speech
would be defined as germane to a whole universe of speech would
negate the purpose that the university created. 254 The university's
mission made this determination more unique and difficult, and thus it
was not a question the Court was willing to answer.255
Although the Court was not willing to answer the question of
germaneness, it found that the unanswered question left open a conceiv-
able avenue for intrusion on the First Amendment rights of objecting
247. Id. at 232 (citing Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 521-22 (1991) (stating that
different members of the Court had varying views on how the germane standard was to be applied to
the union in the case)).
248. Id.; see also Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 520 (stating that there may be a "somewhat hazier" line in
what is or is not "germane" to a union in the public employment sector where the ideological activities
of the union may relate to the collective bargaining agreement). The public employment sector often
spends a significant amount of time and money in negotiating employment agreements in the state or
local legislative avenues. Id. Thus, the activity may be considered political or ideological although it
borders on falling within the purpose of such a union. Id.
249. Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 517, 232 (2000). A bar association's purpose is
often limited to specific issues such as employment relation, negotiation, and representation issues.
Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 525. A university's purpose is not limited to specific issues but instead is a very
broadly defined mission of fostering a wide range of educational experiences. Southworth, 529 U.S. at
231-32.
250. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 232.
251. See id. (inferring that the broad scope of the university's mission, to foster a whole universe
of ideas, did not explicitly or implicitly limit or restrict any speech from such a purpose).
252. Id.
253. See id. (stating that if the university would have defined what is or is not included in "a
whole universe of ideas" the Court could make a distinction between what is or is not germane to that
purpose yet such a definition would defy the ultimate goal of the university).





students. 256 The Court stated that this intrusion was possible because it
was inevitable that a portion of the fees would fund speech that some
students might find objectionable. 257 Since the university's mission was
so broad, there were many different organizations created on campus
with a wide variety of expressive ideas and purposes. 258 Where so many
organizations need funding in order to survive, it was likely that some of
the students' mandated activities fee would be used to further speech
which may be objectionable. 259 The Court noted that if the university
found its mission well-served when students "engage in dynamic discus-
sions of philosophical, religious, scientific, social, and political subjects"
outside the classroom, then the university could require a mandatory fee
to further such speech. 260 However, the objecting students must still be
afforded some protection. 261
The Court concluded that the standard that would protect objecting
students when the government allocated their funds was the requirement
of viewpoint neutrality. 262 This standard was taken from the precedents
of public forum cases, but it was given substance in a university setting in
Rosenberger.263 Although Rosenberger addressed an issue similar to
that in Southworth, it failed to answer the primary question of the
Southworth inquiry: whether a public university could be allowed to re-
quire its students to pay a fee to create the facilitation of extracurricular
speech in the first instance.264 The Southworth Court stated that when a
university is mandating its students to pay fees that subsidize speech of
other students, it must not prefer some viewpoints over others.265 There-
fore, in applying the holding of Rosenberger, Southworth held that a
256. Id. By answering the germaneness question, the Court would define what speech is or is not
constitutional and offer objecting students a clearer distinction. Id. By not answering the germaneness
question, the Court leaves open the question of whether the university is violating objecting students'
First Amendment rights by compelling them to fund private speech. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 237.
259. Id. at 232.
260. See id. at 233 (stating that if the speech is furthering the mission of the association, the
association is constitutionally allowed to impose a mandatory fee to sustain and support the purpose no
matter how broadly it may be defined).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See id. (discussing Rosenberger's holding as imposing the viewpoint neutrality standard
when a university is administering the student fee program to fund student speech and not the
university's own speech). Rosenberger centered on the issue of student rights in an extracurricular
speech program and offered a viewpoint neutrality protection for objecting students. See Rosenberger
v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 832 (1995) (discussing cases which called for a
claim to access and not necessarily a claim against compelled speech).
264. See Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 228 (2000) (stating that Rosenberger
answered the question of what type of protection should be afforded to objecting students but ignored
whether or not political or ideological speech could be compelled to be funded through the student
activities fee).
265. Id. at 233.
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university must use viewpoint neutrality in mandating and distributing
student fees used to further extracurricular student speech. 266 The Court
stated that a university may provide any type of program it wishes to
foster extracurricular student expression so long as the program's
structure is consistent with the First Amendment.267
The Court expressly stated that its holding on student speech was
not to be inferred as applying to university speech. 268 When the univer-
sity is the speaker, different standards apply than when a student is the
speaker.269 The Court has stated that when the state, acting through its
university, is the speaker, it may form content-based choices. 270 When it
is the university that is speaking, the Court has established that it has
every right to determine the content of the education it provides. 271 The
university may use public funding for the promotion of its own speech
on its own policies or beliefs. 272 In Southworth the Court made clear
that the holding of Rosenberger applied in this case because the speech
was not from the university but from the students themselves. 273
A university is not mandated by the Constitution to require any
other First Amendment protection other than disbursing student fees in a
viewpoint neutral manner. 274 However, the Court noted that a university
could in fact set up its own protection if it wished to do so. 275 If a
university decided that its students' First Amendment rights would be
more adequately safeguarded by having some kind of refund system or
optional funding system, it could implement such a device. 276 A universi-
266. Id.; see also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845-46. The Court noted that there was symmetry in
the viewpoint neutrality holding of Rosenberger and the constitutional right to impose a mandatory fee
in the first instance in the Southworth holding. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 233. Therefore, the Court put
the two holdings together and held that the university may fund the extracurricular activities of its
student organizations with a mandated student activity fee if it uses viewpoint neutrality in its
facilitation process. Id.
267. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 233.
268. Id. at 234-35. University speech is defined as speech by the university, the employees, or
agents of the university. Id.
269. Id. When the university is speaking, it is promoting its own policies or ideas and is thus
offered more constitutional freedom to make its own decisions than when the university is furthering
private student speech. Id.
270. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 (stating that a university is allowed to develop the content
of its mission and therefore must be allowed to make content-based decisions in order to develop and
further its mission).
271. See id. (stating that a university has broad discretion in applying its mission in terms of who
may teach, what may be taught, and how it may be taught).
272. Id.
273. Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000) (stating that the university was using
private funding not to promote its own policies or ideas but instead to promote and further students'
ideas).
274. Id. at 233.
275. See id. (giving an example of such a program as a program where each student would list
which activity he or she is or is not willing to fund).
276. Id. The Court declined to impose such a system but stated that this type of program would
be completely up to the discretion of each individual university. Id. The Court noted, however, that
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ty could implement a program where a student could be refunded a
portion of his or her activity fee upon an individual objection or a
"check the box" program in order to identify and eliminate payment to
organizations the student opposes. 277 The Court made it a point to note
that creating an opt out program may endanger the very program that
the university wishes to support. 278 Some students may take advantage
of this system in order to save money, which in turn would minimize the
funding going to organizations created to further the university's
mission. 279 If the funding became too sparse some of the organizations
would not survive; thus, the university's mission of creating a robust and
broad range of extracurricular expressive activities would not be
possible.280
2. The Constitutionality of Wisconsin's Program
The Court applied the constitutional requirement of viewpoint
neutrality to the Associated Students of Madison program to determine
whether its structure was consistent with the First Amendment. 281 To be
consistent with the First Amendment, the University of Wisconsin's
scheme could not prefer some viewpoints over others in any part of its
structure or operation. 282 The parties stipulated that the facilitation of
the registered student organizations through the Student Government
Activities Fund, the General Student Services Funds, and the Associated
Students of Madison was consistent with the viewpoint neutrality stan-
dard.283 The Court went into no further analysis, holding that when a dis-
bursement of funds respects the viewpoint neutrality standard it will be
upheld as constitutional. 284
The Court found it unclear whether the referendum portion of the
university's distribution scheme was consistent with viewpoint neutrali-
ty. 285 If the function of the referendum aspect created a majority deter-
mination for what was or was not viewpoint neutral, it would not possess
such a program may disrupt the very goal a university wishes to obtain, could become very costly, and
interfere with the facilitation of extracurricular student speech. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 232.
279. Id. If the university created an opt-out program some students may opt out of the program
merely to avoid more costs of their education. Id. If a majority of the students chose to opt out,
current student organization funding would vastly decrease and may deter new organizations from
forming. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 233.
282. Id. at 234.
283. Id. The facilitation process of the Student Government Activities Fund, the General Student
Services Fund, and the Associated Students of Madison is a democratic process that distributes student
funds fairly without reference to the viewpoint of the funded speech. Id. at 222-24.
284. See id. at 234 (inferring that the stipulation controlled the Court's decision).
285. See id. at 235-36 (stating that the Court found it unclear how much protection, if any, the
referendum program would offer for viewpoint neutral decisions).
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the constitutional protection that was required. 286 If access to or denial
of funding was based on a majority decision, it would be possible that
the decision might, in effect, discriminate against some viewpoints. 287
The Court stated that access to or denial of the funding should not need
to depend on majoritarian consent. 288 The Court remanded for further
proceedings any portion of the referendum aspect that was based on a
majority vote.289
3. The Distinction Between On- and Off-Campus Activities
The Court stated that just as a university can decide to afford
students more protection than the First Amendment mandates, it can also
decide the geographical or spatial boundaries of where it is going to
fund expressive activity. 290 The Court, in addressing the issue of geo-
graphical limitations, stated that there was no distinction to be made
between on-campus or off-campus expressive activities of student
organizations. 29 1 The Court stated that there was no mandate by the
Constitution to institute any geographical or spatial restriction on a
university as a condition to funding student organizations. 292 The only
mandate that the Constitution required was redistribution of funding in a
viewpoint neutral manner. 293 Therefore, universities are free to expand
their mission of furthering student encouragement of a vast array of
social, civic, and cultural activities to any geographical bounds they see
fit.294 Today is an age of communication, and there have been expan-
sive changes in the information arena, making it nearly impossible for
the Court to insist upon or mandate geographical limitations on obtain-
ing information. 295 The Court stated that with a proper application of
286. See id. (stating that the theory behind the viewpoint neutral standard is to be able to regard
minority views with the same respect as majority views).
287. Id.
288. Id. The Court relied on the principle that access to a public forum does not depend on
majoritarian consent. Id.
289. Id.
290. See id. at 233-34 (stating that a university should be able to further its mission in any
geographical area it wishes and this includes both on-and off-campus activity funding). The Court
refrained from imposing any geographical or spatial boundaries as conditions to funding a student
organization since universities have a substantial interest in ensuring that students have the opportunity
to participate in a wide variety of social and cultural experiences. Id. at 234.
291. See id. (stating that the respondents expressed there was no connection to the student
opposition to off-campus activities and the university imposing a fee to begin with).
292. Id.
293. Id. at 235.
294. Id. at 233. The objecting students in Southworth argued that the off-campus funding often
did not relate to the university's goal of fostering student speech and its reason for imposing the
segregated fee. Id. at 234. The Court noted that if the university had the same concern, the university
may restrict off-campus expenditures or travel reimbursements as long as it is done in a viewpoint
neutral manner Id.
295. See id. The Court stated that a university, like all of society, is expanding in this age of
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viewpoint' neutrality, a university is allowed broad geographical latitude,
without infringing upon students' First Amendment protections.
296
B. JUSTICE SOUTER'S CONCURRENCE
The Court unanimously held that it was not a violation of students'
First Amendment rights to allow a university to mandate funding for
student organizations' extracurricular expressive activities. 297 However,
Justice Souter wrote a concurring opinion which stated that the majority
went too far in insisting upon a "cast iron viewpoint neutrality require-
ment" in upholding the university's student activity program. 298 He
found that the students' objections did not need a "cast iron" First
Amendment protection other than the viewpoint neutrality already grant-
ed. 299 Justice Souter asserted that the scheme offered by the university
granted enough protection and that the Court did not have to insist that
this standard be strictly defined. 300 Justice Souter thought that the
question to be answered was "not . . . whether viewpoint neutrality is
required, but whether Southworth has a claim to relief from this specific
viewpoint neutral scheme." 301 In answering this narrowed question, he
considered two foundations of law.
302
The first foundation of law was comprised of case law precedent dis-
cussing the "umbrella of academic freedom." 303 Justice Souter stated
that this might have been implicated by the university in its discussion of
the importance of the activity fee in carrying out its educational
mission. 304  Academic freedom was defined as giving learning
institutions the discretion of what and how to teach by giving them
freedom from any restrictions on thought, expression, and association
within the institution. 30 5  The prior case law dealt with issues of
information, and it is finding that traditional boundaries are becoming too difficult to insist upon. Id.
296. Id. at 233-34. If the university's mission is to create and foster student debate and to en-
courage students to take advantage of social, civic, and religious experiences, then it may further this
mission wherever it sees necessary as long as it is furthered in a viewpoint neutral manner. Id. at 234.
297. Id. at 236 (Souter, J., concurring).
298. Id. Justice Souter was joined in his concurrence by Justices Stevens and Breyer. Id.
299. See id. (stating that they would have not gone any further). Justice Souter stated that he
limited his examination of the case to the general distribution scheme of the university and agreed with
the Court that the referendum issue should be remanded for further findings. Id. at 236 n.l.
300. Id. at 236. Justice Souter stated that the question of whether viewpoint neutrality needed to
be required did not even need to be reached in order to decide this case. Id. He noted that the
university program is already facilitated in a viewpoint neutral fashion and the parties have stipulated
to that fact. Id. at 236 n.2.
301. Id. at 236.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 237.
304. Id. (citing a statement of the Associate Dean of the Students which noted the University of
Wisconsin's academic importance of the funding program).
305. Id. (citing Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 n.12 (1985)). The Court
has further explained "[a]cademic freedom thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited
exchange of ideas among teachers and students, but also, and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous
decision making by the academy itself." Ewing, 474 U.S. at 226 n.12 (citations omitted).
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restrictions imposed from outside the university on individual teachers
and individual organizations. 306  He noted that the constitutional
importance of academic freedom has been historically recognized by the
Court; however, those cases answered more limited questions and did not
compel the conclusion that objecting students would not have a First
Amendment claim in this situation. 307 Justice Souter also stated that it
may be just enough in the First Amendment analysis to protect a
university's liberty to mold its own educational mission. 30 8  If a
university is allowed to mold its own mission, it only needs to follow its
own mold in order to stay within First Amendment boundaries. 309
The second foundation of law implicated in answering whether the
activities fee could be abolished involved the comparison of Southworth
to cases in which mandated governmental speech required relief.3 10
Justice Souter first addressed prior case law in which the government
imposed upon the objectors by restricting messages or requiring an
individual to bear the government's statements. 311 He suggested that
those cases in which the government was "imposing far more directly
306. Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 239 n.4 (2000) (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 591-92 (1967), Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960), Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 236 (1957), and Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 184-85 (1952)). This
case law is distinguished from Southworth because Southworth deals with the broader issue of the
university redistributing individual student funds to a wide variety of outside speech, rather than the
specific issue of speech of an individual teacher or organization's speech. Id. at 238.
307. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 238-39 (stating that the Court has stated that there is a broad
protection for academic freedom that stretches to barring the legislature from imposing conditions on
the array of viewpoints expressed in a higher learning institution). Even if academic freedom would
control, the Court has never held that universities are beyond the reach of the First Amendment. Id. at
239. The Court noted, however, that it would not render an opinion on an academic freedom aspect in
this case since the university did not argue it as an issue. Id.
308. Id. Justice Souter explained the significance of a university's ability to define its own
mission. Id. (citing Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 262-64 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). Justice Frankfurter, in
Sweezy, described the open universities in South Africa:
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to
speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail "the
four essential freedoms" of a university-to determine for itself on academic grounds
who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to
study.
Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263.
309. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 239.
310. Id. at 239-40.
311. See id. (citing Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.,
515 U.S. 557, 572-74 (1995) and Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707 (1977)). The government
was also not mandating an individual student to personally bear an offensive statement. Id. (citing
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 707). Southworth addressed a more indirect issue of the government compelling
student speech by its registered student organizations furthering the message of others. Id. at 239.
Prior case law restricted the government from restricting or modifying an individual's message or
mandating an individual to personally accept and bear the government's offensive statements. Id.; see
also Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572-74 (holding that the government may not restrict an individual's
message); Wooley, 430 U.S. at 707 (holding that the government may not mandate an individual to
personally bear an offensive message).
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and offensively on an objecting individual," as opposed to indirectly
funding messages of other speakers, were not controlling. 3 12 In
Southworth, the government was merely taking a small portion of
student funds and redistributing it to organizations that expressed
objectionable views. 313 The student activity fees were a fairly small
portion of the total money students pay for an education, and the
amount of the funding going to speech the student may have found to
be objectionable was an even smaller portion.314 The government was
merely compelling a small portion of the students' funds to go to
expressive organizations; this was not as large of a limitation on the
freedom of speech as it would have been had the government restricted a
student's expressive activity. 315
Justice Souter next agreed with the Court that the Abood and Keller
cases did not control the remedy in this case and explained why it did
not in a four-part analysis. 3 16 First, he stated that in Southworth there
was not enough of a connection between the fee payer and the ultimate
objectionable message. 3 17 In unions and bar associations, there was a
direct connection between the fee payer and message because the fee
payer was forced to contribute funds to the very organization advancing
the objectionable message. 318 In Southworth, the student was forced to
contribute funds to a distributing agency which was not itself promoting
or advancing any personal views. 319
Second, because the government's mission was to "broaden public
discourse" Justice Souter found that the students' argument did not
hold as much force as it might otherwise have held with a more limited
mission. 320 A university's mission is not to restrict or censor speech but
instead to foster and enhance the students' knowledge by providing a
312. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 239-40.
313. Id. at 239.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 239-40 (discussing that mandating a student activities fee to support other student
speech was at best indirectly imposing government speech upon individuals); see also Hurley, 515 U.S.
at 572-74; Wooley, 430 U.S. at 707.
316. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 240.
317. Id. Justice Souter stated that the connection is more attenuated in Southworth since the indi-
vidual student's fee was not given directly to the ultimate message but rather was distributed through
an agency to fund a multitude of messages, some objectionable and some not. Id.
318. Id. The ultimate message of the union and bar association was given its force through the
mandated fees of its members. Id.
319. See id. (stating that the agency was not the speaker since it did not possess any social,
political, or ideological character and was not itself engaging in the expression of the distinct
message).
320. See id. at 240-41 (stating the reason is because the fees in this situation support a govern-
mental scheme that strives to broaden public discourse and those goals that are vital to self-governing
people).
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wide range of expressive activity on and off campus. 321 A university
uses public funding to facilitate and encourage its students to engage in
public debate and participate in the electoral process. 322 Such goals are
important and vital to a self-governing democratic society.323 "Thus
[the program] further[ed], not abridg[ed], pertinent First Amendment
values." 324 This is a standard that the Court has recognized outside the
realm of government spending, and the same consideration in those
cases went against the contributors' objection to the system in this area
because a university's mission is the basis for the student funding and
the students' education. 325
Third, the compelled speech and funding cases were distinguishable
based on the legitimacy of the government's interest. 326 The govern-
ment's interest in Southworth lent itself to supporting activities, which
provided an educational value that was distinguishable from a union's
interest in supporting views beyond the purpose of "collective bargain-
ing," and a bar association's interest in supporting speech beyond the
purpose of regulating the legal profession. 327 The government's interest
in a university is to provide and encourage a wide range of expressive
activity, which is a much broader interest than that of a union or a bar
association. 328
Last, the university setting itself, where students fund a wide variety
of speech, some objectionable and some not, merely by paying tuition,
underscored the argument that funding speech was somehow different
through the activity fee.329 Justice Souter asserted that by paying tuition,
321. Id. at 241. The program used the funds to promote and enhance public discussion. Id.
322. Id. Justice Souter noted that the university fee in this situation was a tax, which was paid
into a state account and disbursed through a state program. Id. ; see also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 36.09(5)
(West 1992 & Supp. 2000). He then followed by stating that prior case law suggests the government
may constitutionally use its tax revenue to further public discourse. Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529
U.S. 217, 241 (2000).
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. See id. at 242 (discussing PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980)
(rejecting a shopping mall owner's claim of the government not being able to use his private property
as a public forum for other people's expressions)). The Court upheld a First Amendment right for
individuals to express their potentially objectionable views on a shopping mall owner's property,
stating that there was no danger that such a requirement would "dampen the vigor and limit the variety
of public debate." PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 87-88 (quoting Miami Herald Pbl'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S.
241, 257 (1974)).
326. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 242. Justice Souter stated that government's interest of furthering
public discourse and goals vital to self-governing people was a much more substantial interest than
merely supporting collective bargaining or a professional regulatory program. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. Justice Souter noted that the government's objective in Southworth should be distin-
guished from a case in which the university wishes to mandate a student to fund religious evangelism.
Id. at 242 n.10 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 868-71 (1995)).
329. See id. at 242-43 (stating that it is undisputed that some tuition dollars go to fund course
offerings that may be objectionable).
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students are paying for all types of university speech and a wide range of
expression taught in classrooms. 330 Surely, there are teachers who are
teaching subjects that may be objectionable to some students, and if tui-
tion cannot be refunded upon such an objection, it seems unreasonable
to allow a different holding for the activity fee. 331 Since tuition is not
optional and the government is allowed to use student funds for speech
that may be found objectionable, Justice Souter found it troublesome to
see how the activity fee could confer a more believable argument for a
refund. 332
IV. IMPACT
The Court did not expressly state whether its holding would apply
in other organizations with broad missions based upon expressive con-
duct. 333 However, the Court did not state that this holding was only
applicable to a university setting and could not be applied elsewhere. 334
The language in Southworth seems to suggest that its holding could be
applied to all higher learning settings or any learning facility with the
goal of broadening public discussion. 335 The Court and Justice Souter's
concurrence gave substance to the legitimacy of the government's pur-
pose and seemed to imply that the government's interest may also be a
factor to consider. 336 Justice Souter also stated in his concurring opinion
that the government's interest in encouraging public debate on a wide
variety of subjects is more substantial than the government's interest in
collective bargaining or a professional regulatory program. 33 7
Therefore, a government mandated fee may be more likely upheld to
fund objectionable speech when the government has a legitimate interest
330. Id. at 243.
331. Id. Justice Souter also noted that there is no claim that the university is somehow required to
offer a wide variety of courses in order to comply with a viewpoint neutrality standard. Id. (citing
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 892-93 nn.11-12 (Souter, J., dissenting)). He followed by stating "The
University need not provide junior years abroad in North Korea as well as France, instruct in the
theory of plutocracy as well as democracy, or teach Nietzsche as well as St. Thomas." Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 221-235.
334. Id. The only exception is when the government is the speaker, which is addressed in prior
case law. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92-93 (1976).
335. Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 233 (2000). The Court stated that if a university
reached the conclusion that its mission is being furthered when its students engage in public discussion
and debate in "philosophical, religious, scientific, social, and political subjects" outside the classroom,
it is able to impose a mandatory fee to encourage the open dialogue. Id. (inferring that when there is a
broad mission of encouraging public discussion and debate, open dialogue will be permissible to the
point it furthers the mission).
336. See id. at 231-32, 242 (stating that the government had a legitimate interest in Southworth
because the fee went to further educational values versus other cases where the fee only supported a
specific area such as collective bargaining).
337. See id. at 242 (stating that educational value is derived from a university's interest in
creating an arena of speech).
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in furthering a broad mission developed to foster and sustain public
discussion and debate. 338
A. STUDENT ACTIVITY FEES IN THE FUTURE
It is now clear that a university which seeks to foster a wide range of
political or ideological speech in order to further its educational mission,
may do so if it is done in a viewpoint neutral manner. 339 It is also clear
that a registered student organization program, like the one at the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin, is a constitutionally permissible way of abiding by the
viewpoint neutral standard. 340 It is not clear from this decision, however,
if a referendum manner of distributing student funds is constitutional. 341
The Court noted that when minority views are not treated with the same
equality as majority views, viewpoint neutrality is undermined. 342 There-
fore, the Court inferred that the referendum program should not be held
constitutional if minority views are not being treated as equally as the
majority views.343
B. APPLICATION TO NORTH DAKOTA LAW
North Dakota universities must now comply with the viewpoint
neutrality standard specifically mandated to universities through the hold-
ing in Southworth.344 It is clear that if a university within North Dakota
has an educational mission developed to encourage a wide range of
student speech, the university is allowed to impose a mandatory fee upon
its students to further such a mission.345 The university may also create
or sustain a student organization program analogous to the one
implemented by the University of Wisconsin. 346 However, if the univer-
sity has a referendum program implemented, it may need to change how
funding distributions are made in the future. 347
338. Id. at 233-43. The Court and Justice Souter in his concurrence agreed that Abood and
Keller did not control in a university setting since the mission of a university is a much broader mission
that compels a broader remedy to further the results it seeks. Id.
339. Id. at 234-35.
340. Id. at 236. The grant scheme followed by the student government programs was stipulated
to by the parties as viewpoint neutral, and the Court agreed, finding it viewpoint neutral as a matter of
law. Id.
341. See id. at 235-36 (stating that it is different from the student government programs since it
requires a majority vote instead of following a democratic process that protects viewpoint neutrality).
342. Id. at 235. There is a likely probability that the majority may vote on viewpoints, and thus
viewpoint neutrality could not be protected. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 236.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 235.
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Effective April 4, 2000, the North Dakota State Board of Higher
Education Policy Manual was amended to state the current conditions
and procedures under which North Dakota higher learning institutions
may collect student activity fees. 348 The policy states that institutions
may collect an activities fee to support "student activities, including, but
not limited to, student organizations, and clubs, lyceums, drama, music,
field trips and student publications." 349 The allocation of the funds is to
be administered, pursuant to the institution's procedures set by the
student government as a part of its annual budget. 350 The student
government process should allow for organizations to request review for
funding.351 This allocation process is to be reviewed and approved by
the institution's president. 352
At the University of North Dakota, student fees are collected, and a
portion of the money is given to the Student Government. 353 The
Student Government is comprised of many subcommittees, including the
Student Activities Committee (SAC) and the University Program Council,
which all play a role in sponsoring registered student organizations and
activities. 354 SAC then distributes the student fee money to student
organizations under the guidelines set out in its constitution. 355
Each organization must present the Student Organization Center
(SOC) with an operating budget by the first Wednesday in November,
which is used to request funding for daily operation costs. 356 However,
348. NORTH DAKOTA HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY MANUAL § 805.2 (2000).
349. Id. The policy also states in subsection 2 that institutions may collect a college fee that
supports the student body, "including, but not limited to, debt retirement, student union operations,
athletics, and [career] services." Id. This fee amount is established by the institution's president with
input from the student government body. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id. The policy manual also states in subsection 3 that the chancellor should establish waiver
policies for those students who audit course work, senior citizens, and students enrolled in the
institution for distance education courses. Id.
353. Student Fees; Supreme Court Decision was Correct Ruling for Students' Interests, UNIV. OF
N.D. DAKOTA STUDENT, April 4,2000, at 4.
354. Id.; see also UNivERsrrY OF NORTH DAKOTA STUDENT ACTIvrrIES COMMITrEE CONST. art. 1.
"The Student Activities Committee [SAC] was established on May 24, 1956 as a presidential
committee to coordinate and supervise student activities." Id. In 1966, SAC was given University
Senate Committee status, and in 1976, by action of the University Senate, SAC became a standing
committee of the Student Senate and provided its members with a constitution. Id.
355. STUDENT AcTivrIEs COMM. CONST., supra note 354, at art. V. The SAC Constitution provides
guidelines that various groups must meet before becoming eligible for funding. Id. These guidelines
provide an explanation of what may be funded from student activity fees. Id. The guidelines show
four main areas of funding, including: operating costs, programming costs, transportation costs, and
equipment funding. Id.
356. See id. (stating that costs include printing, telephone, and office supplies). The operating
budget is intended to defray the costs of daily operations of student organizations including the cost of
postage, office supplies, long distance telephone expense, advertising, printing, and other expenses.
Id. Each student organization may receive only one allocation for operating expense per fiscal year.
Id.
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if an organization wishes to request funding for programs, equipment, or
transportation it may request this from SOC at any time. 357 The organi-
zation must then speak before SAC, and SAC will then vote on the
funding. 358 There are separate guidelines regarding when SAC is able to
fund organization's programs, equipment, or transportation. 359 Program
funding is provided to student organizations for programs that are
perceived as a benefit to the students of the University of North
Dakota. 360 Transportation and equipment funding is distributed only if
it is essential to the student organization's existence. 361
When a student organization requests funding, the organization
makes its request in writing to SOC and then appears before SAC.362
This commission is composed of eleven voting members and includes
the tie breaking vote of the chairperson of the committee. 363 The
commission hears the request in an open session, asks any questions it
may have, and then proceeds to vote on the request. 364 If the request is
granted, the funds become available to the student organization through
a university account system.365
If an organization is not satisfied with SAC's decision, it may follow
the appeals process set out in the SAC Constitution. 366 The structure of
the University of North Dakota's student activity disbursement is a view-
point neutral facilitation process. 367 The State of Affairs Coordinator for
the University of North Dakota's Student Senate stated that the univer-
sity's distribution of student fees furthers the established educational
mission, thus leaving the University of North Dakota's program constitu-
tionally permissible. 368
North Dakota State University has an allocation process similar to
the process at the University of North Dakota. 369 North Dakota State
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id. These guidelines are set out in the SAC Constitution. Id. Student organizations are
limited to two allocations of program funding during any fiscal year. Id.
360. Id. Program funding helps defray the costs of conferences, speakers, films, dances, or
other similar events. Id.
361. Id. The guidelines also provide that transportation expenses are partially covered by the
individual students who are traveling. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id. at art. IV. Eight of the members are students who are appointed by the Student Senate.
Id. Each student attending the University of North Dakota who is of "good standing" may be eligible






368. Sherri Richards, Student Fees Upheld to be Constitutional, UNiv. OF N.D. DAKcrA STUDENT,
April 4, 2000, at 3.
369. NDSU STUDENT GOVERNMENT CONST.; see also STUDENT ACrTVMES COMM. CONST., supra
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University distributes its student activity fee through its Student Senate
and Finance Commission. 370 The Student Finance Commission is a
commission composed of the executive branch of student government
and nine voting members. 371 The Student Finance Commission at North
Dakota State University also allocates funding according to a predeter-
mined set of guidelines. 372 The areas of funding at North Dakota State
University are similar to those previously listed for the University of
North Dakota. 373 The Student Finance Commission allocates funding
according to the predetermined guidelines after a written request has
been made by the organization. 374 A member of the student organiza-
tion will then appear before the commission to make the request and
answer any questions. 375 The commission then votes on whether the
student organization should be allocated the funding. 376 All funding
decisions are presented to the Student Senate for approval and to the
president of the university for ratification. 377
Both the University of North Dakota's and North Dakota State
University's funding schemes are similar to the viewpoint neutral grant
scheme in Southworth.378 Neither of the North Dakota universities
distributes its mandated activities fees based upon a majority vote. 379
They both have a process that protects viewpoint neutrality and as a
result are both constitutionally permissible under the Court's holding in
Southworth. 3 8
0
The other public institutions of higher learning across the state have
similar but less detailed plans for distributing student fees. 381 These
note 354.
370. STUDENT GOVERNMENT CONST., supra note 369, at art. III, § 5.
371. Id. Eight of the voting commission members are students; two of the students are appointed
by Student Senate and the remaining six are appointed by the Finance Commissioner, subject to the
Senate's approval. Id. Any North Dakota State University student is eligible to be a member of the
Finance Commission. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id.; see also STUDENT Acrtvrras COMM. CONST., supra note 354. The main difference be-
tween the two universities is that North Dakota State requires each student organization to submit its
operating budget in the spring for the following year. STUDENT GOVERNMENT CONST., supra note 369, at
art. III, § 5.
374. STUDENT GOVERNMENT CONST., supra note 369, at art. III, § 5. If a student organization later
requests additional funding, the organization must make a contingency request. Id. The contingency
request is similar to the University of North Dakota's requests for program or transportation funding.
Id.; see also STUDENT AcrrvrrlEs COMM. CONST., supra note 354.
375. STUDENT GOVERNMENT CONST., supra note 369, at art III, § 5.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id; see also STUDENT ACrIvITiEs CoMM. CONST., supra note 354; Bd. of Regents v. South-
worth, 529 U.S. 217, 217-31 (2000).
379. STUDENT GOVERNMENT C ONST., supra note 369, at art. III § 5; see also STUDENT AcrnvrEs
COMM. CONST., supra note 354.
380. STUDENT GOVERNMENT CONST., supra note 369, at art. III, § 5; see also STUDENT ACTIvmES
COMM. CONST., supra note 354; Southworth, 529 U.S. at 234-35.
381. Telephone interview with David Clark, Vice President of Operations and Corporate and
Continuing Education, Bismarck State College (Mar. 2001); telephone interview with Mark Lowe,
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plans closely resemble the distribution process of North Dakota State
University and the University of North Dakota in that a fee is collected
through the business office and then subsequently distributed to student
organizations through a student senate. 382 Smaller universities generally
have fewer student organizations due to the fact that the student popu-
lation is less.383 Thus, there are fewer organizations that are engaged in
speech activities. 384 Generally these universities distribute to organiza-
tions such as a campus center, athletics, campus improvements, students'
dances and theater arts. 385 When smaller North Dakota universities
distribute their fees through a student senate, the universities are dis-
tributing student activity fees in a fashion similar to the University of
North Dakota and North Dakota State University. 386 Since such distribu-
tion schemes distribute fees in like fashion and not by referendum, they
would also be constitutionally valid schemes under the Southworth
decision. 387
The holding in Southworth would not extend to the higher learn-
ing institutions in North Dakota that do not mandate a student activity
fee for the funding of extracurricular student organizations. 388 There-
fore, North Dakota universities which distribute fees to university pro-
grams such as student health, athletics, and campus improvements, but
not to any student-run extracurricular organizations will not be affected
by the Southworth decision.
V. CONCLUSION
In Southworth, the Court expanded the holding of Rosenberger.389
The Court determined that it was constitutionally permissible for a
controller, Dickinson State University (Aug. 2001); telephone interview with Randall Fixen, Chairman
of Campus Activities, Lake Region State College (Oct. 2001); telephone interview with Janice
Jorgensen, accountant, Mayville State University, (Aug. 2001); telephone interview with Sharon
Berning, controller, Minot State University (Aug. 2001); telephone interview with Ann Bergeron,
accountant, Minot State University-Bottineau Campus (Oct. 2001); telephone interview with Claire
Byron, business office personnel, North Dakota State College of Science (Aug. 2001); telephone
interview with William Ament, business office personnel, Valley City State University (Aug. 2001);
telephone interview with Hugh Long, Student Activity Director, Williston State College (Aug. 2001).
382. See telephone interviews, supra note 381; see also SrUDENr GOVERNMENT CONST., supra note
369, at art. III § 5; STUDENT AcrvrrEs COMM. CONST., supra note 354.
383. See telephone interviews, supra note 381.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id.; see also STUDENT GOVERNMENT CONST., supra note 369, at art. III, § 5; STUDENT
ACrvrTlEs COMM. CONST., supra note 354.
387. See telephone interviews, supra note 381; see also STUDENT GovERNMENr CONST., supra note
369, at art. III, § 5; STUDENT AcTrivriEs COMM. CONST., supra note 354; Bd. of Regents v. Southworth,
529 U.S. 217, 234-35 (2000).
388. See, e.g., Bismarck State College 2001-2002 Disbursement Plan for Service/Facility Fee (on
file with author) (demonstrating that Bismarck State College does not fund extracurricular student
organizations through a student activities fee); see also Southworth, 529 U.S. at 234-35.
389. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 234-35; see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845 (1995).
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university to mandate student fees for the furtherance of extracurricular
student speech. 390 The Court also more clearly defined the limitation on
mandated funding in order to have some First Amendment protection
for objecting students, holding that any funding scheme must be admin-
istered in a viewpoint neutral fashion. 391 The Court did not overrule
Abood and Keller; therefore, they are still good law in the context of
public organizations seeking to further a more narrow goal. 392
The Court expressly stated in Southworth that the germaneness
standard used in previous case law was inapplicable in the university
setting because of the purpose the university's mission seeks to
achieve. 393 Since a wide range of diverse speech is the very goal the uni-
versity wishes to achieve, the Court stated that it would be too difficult,
and almost contradictory, to define what is germane in that context. 394
The Court did not abolish the germaneness inquiry entirely, but it did
reaffirm that it had previously found it difficult to define what was
germane to an association's mission.395 The unmanageability, however,
came only at the point when an organization, such as a university, seeks
to stimulate an entire universe of ideas.396
Jessica Johnson Skaare
390. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 234-35.
391. Id.
392. See id. at 231-32 (stating that the standards used in the prior case law were unworkable in a
university context). When the goal is a more narrow one, such as collective bargaining or regulating
the legal profession, rather than a broader goal of furthering a wide range of expressive activity, the
government may further expression if it is germane to the purpose of the association. Id. The
germaneness standard is workable in an association with a more narrowly drawn purpose because it is




395. Id. (citing Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 521-22 (1991)).
396. Id.
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